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1. INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times, military power has been used to 
protect or redefine boundaries, raise or supress revolutions, 
attain religious feats. With technological development, military 
tactics and targets have changed a lot. With the collapse of 
erstwhile USSR and bipolar world, opening of markets, focus of 
international security scenario has shifted from politico-military 
to politico-economic conflicts. Following two devastating world 
wars (WW I and WW II), numerous international peace treaties 
have now made the possibility of full-fledged military conflicts 
inconsequential. Though conventional military remains central 
to offensive and defensive strategies, many nations have 
focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which may 
be based on either nuclear, chemical or biological materials. As 
compared to nuclear and chemical weapons, bio-weapons or 
biological warfare (BW) agents are far cheaper, can be prepared 
using simple processes in legitimate and moderately equipped 
biological laboratories and are therefore easy to conceal1. BW 
agents are self-propagating in nature, due to which very small 
starting amounts are required to affect target population in a 
large geographic area, within a very short-time frame.
Since, no state publicises or report such BW facilities or 
capabilities, authentic reports on this topic are rare and available 
information is mostly based on declassified intelligence reports 
and unconfirmed or suspected incidences. These reports suggest 
that different state and non-state (terrorist) organisations and 
even religious cults have purposefully used biological agents 
for various nefarious purposes. Additionally, increasing 
economic competition among nations has raised the possibility 
of damaging economic assets of the competitor to destabilise 
its socio-political and economic affairs. Agriculture is one such 
sector, which can easily be targeted with maligned intentions. 
Deliberate use of biological agents to destroy agriculture is 
broadly termed as ‘agroterrorism’, and can be used to seriously 
destabilise socio-economic matters of an agriculture-based 
state by targeting its food crops, cash crops, agriculture-based 
industries etc.2. Such a warfare is elusive yet devastating for 
nations whose economies are directly dependent on agricultural 
sectors or indirectly to its allies that import food from these 
nations. Agroterrorism aptly fits into the prediction by Shintaro 
Ishihara, a Japanese politician who said that “the twenty-first 
century will be a century of economic warfare”3.
Agriculture or agriculture-based sectors are relatively 
easy targets, attacks are difficult to detect, and have far 
reaching effects, as compared to BW against humans. It has 
been estimated that about a dozen countries are conducting 
clandestine research programs in developing anti-agricultural 
agents for tactical applications2. The fact that, economies of 
several countries are dependent on a small number of principal 
crops, which makes them even more vulnerable to agroterrorism. 
Nations, such as ours, whose economy is heavily agriculture-
based (producer, exporter), and is neighboured by nations 
having competitive economies and anecdotal BW capabilities, 
are more susceptible to such threats. At present, agroterrorism 
is primarily aimed at disrupting food security or crippling 
economy1,2,4,5. Based on the objectives, agroterrorism has been 
broadly classified into three different scenarios- Biowarfare, 
Bioterrorism and Biocrime5. 
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2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AGROTERRORISM
Since ancient times, infectious microorganisms or 
biological toxins are used in asymmetric warfare. Even though 
primarily used against humans, there are several incidences 
signifying use of biological agents against animals, agriculture, 
food and water. It is claimed that during 660 BC, Assyrians 
used mycotoxin containing rye ergot (Claviceps purpurea) 
to contaminate enemy water sources6,7. In the 20th century, 
during World War I (WW I), Germans allegedly used glanders 
(Burkholderia mallei) and anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) to 
infect horses while used fungi to contaminate food grain stores, 
intended for supplies to allied forces in Europe8,9. Reportedly, 
during WW II, US initiated large scale BW research and 
development program to counter similar programs by Japan and 
Germany and biological agents causing rust in rice, wheat or rye 
and animal diseases like anthrax, glanders and rinderpest, were 
allegedly stockpiled1,8,9. It is claimed that initially US planned 
to destroy rice crop in Japan, but later decided to use atomic 
bomb to force Japan to surrender1. Nevertheless, during WW 
II, Japan supposedly used biological agents against crops and 
livestock in Mongolia and Russia10,11. US reportedly stockpiled 
wheat stem rust and rice blast pathogens, while UK (under 
“Operation Vegetarian”) stockpiled anthrax cakes to spread 
over Germany. Following WW II, few countries including 
USA, UK and former Soviet Union apparently continued 
offensive research programs on anti-agriculture fungal and 
bacterial pathogens against potato, rice, wheat, rubber11,12. 
Officially, US and UK have now abandoned offensive BW 
research programs11.
During 1970s, sensing impending dangers of rapidly 
proliferating chemical and biological weapons, the international 
community constituted the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) in 1972 to “prohibit the development, 
production, acquisition, transfer, retention, stockpiling and use 
of biological and toxin weapons”13. Till 2018, more than 180 
countries have signed this treaty, but absence of monitoring 
mechanism has limited its efficacy and several member nations 
are claimed to continue developing BW facilities. It has been 
reported that former Soviet Union continued its BW program 
until 1992 and are suspected to have weaponised biological 
agents against wheat and rice14,15. Following Gulf War in 1991, 
the UN Special Commission reported an Iraqi BW program, 
primarily focussed on fungal pathogens causing devastation of 
cereal crops16. 
According to the Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 
several alleged, failed or confirmed incidences of agroterrorism 
have took place around the globe in recent past, with the 
primary aim to destruct economically important crops. Lately, 
biocontrol programs, by UK and US-led UNDCp (United 
Nations International Drug Control program) were undertaken 
to use fungal pathogens (Mycoherbicides) against drug crops 
(coca and poppy) in drug growing countries17,18. Although 
the UN General Assembly explicitly rejected the proposal, 
USA continued funding the research and maintained its 
categorisation as ‘biological control’ instead of ‘biological 
weapons’ and justified their use with the approval by 
government of the state where they are intended to be used17. 
The anti-coca mycoherbicide species, Fusarium oxysporum 
f. sp. erythroxyli (isolate EN-4) was isolated by USDA (US 
Department of Agriculture), whereas the anti-opium poppy 
mycoherbicide species Pleospora papaveracea was isolated 
by the Tashkent Institute of Genetics, plants and Experimental 
Biology, Uzbekistan, under combined program of US, UK, and 
UNDCp17. Nevertheless, there remains a risk of their aggressive 
/ non-peaceful use and their effect on non-target plants/crops, 
which may lead to unknown consequences on environment and 
human health17,18. 
3. ADVANTAGES OF TARGETING AN 
AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM
As compared to use of anti-human BW agents, 
agroterrorism has numerous advantages. Agricultural lands are 
large and highly dispersed in terms of geographical areas, have 
poor surveillance and are thus most vulnerable to deliberate 
attacks. In general, practise of mono-culture of crops (less 
or no genetic variability) makes an agro-ecosystem more 
susceptible to agroterrorism. Furthermore, pathogens/pests 
once established in an agro-ecosystem are difficult to eradicate, 
resulting in severe effect on consecutive crops. Additionally, 
attack with an unknown pests/pathogen are difficult to diagnose, 
causing failure of mitigation strategies. Such introduction 
often resembles natural outbreak, and multiple introductions 
can be initiated remotely through contaminated seeds and 
planting materials, fertilizers, keeping the attack clandestine19. 
As compared to chemical/nuclear or biological-agents against 
humans, technical know-how required to weaponise an anti-
agriculture agent is considerably less. Being harmless to 
humans, manipulation, stockpiling and transportation of anti-
agriculture agents require minimum containment facilities. 
Moreover, emotional repulsion of the perpetrator following 
an agro-terrorist attack would be significantly less than that 
associated with an attack on humans.
4. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATURAL 
DISEASE OUTBREAK AND A POSSIBLE 
AGROTERRORISM ATTACK
Although it is extremely difficult, there are certain cues 
that may sometimes help to differentiate an act of agroterrorism 
from a natural outbreak. Generally, an attack may be 
distinguished by rapid and vigorous effects on target crops, as 
compared to natural outbreak having defined dynamics, spatio-
temporal distribution and mode of transmission. Moreover, an 
intentional attack is mostly targeted towards a highly productive 
crop, while a natural outbreak can occur irrespective of the 
productivity. Additionally, if disease symptoms indicate a 
vector-borne disease, natural vectors may or may not be present 
in an intentional attack or their population dynamics may show 
unpredicted patterns, while in natural outbreak, vectors are 
expected to show expected patterns of population dynamics. 
In recent years genetic profiling through molecular biology 
tools has become an essential component of surveillance and 
monitoring. Deliberate spread of exotic pathogens/pests or 
their strains, may be distinguished by comparing the genetic 
fingerprint of the endemic pathogens/pests. Therefore, a 
genetic database of pathogens/pests endemic in a vulnerable 
crop-ecosystems needs to be created and regularly updated. 
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Taken together, precise disease pattern and genetic make-up 
of the causative agent are important factors in differentiating 
between natural and deliberate attack. Thus, baseline disease 
surveillance data (epidemiological/genetic), continued 
monitoring, investigation and ground intelligence on unusual 
outbreaks are essential to identify an act of agroterrorism. 
5. POTENTIAL AGENTS/ GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED PATHOGENS FOR 
AGROTERRORIST ATTACK
It is estimated that there are thousands of plant diseases20 
and hundreds of different diseases for a given crop, worldwide. 
Of these, several pathogens can be used by terrorists as weapon, 
according to the feasibility under certain environmental 
conditions to cause maximum damage. However, there are 
very scanty reports on organisms that could potentially be used 
as weapons. This is more important because a certain plant 
pathogen in a given geographic environment may be endemic, 
but effect of its introduction into a new agro-ecosystem may be 
disastrous. Thus, it is important for a country to have a list of 
pathogens that are common or endemic within its boundaries, 
and at the same time another list of pathogens that are not 
present/ reported but have potential to destroy agriculture, 
which should be updated continuously. 
In the last few decades, rapid advances in biotechnology 
and genetic engineering technologies, have raised the 
possibility of using these technologies by adversaries to 
modify natural pathogens to make them virulent, resistance 
breaking and tolerant to diverse weather conditions to suit 
military requirements. Although, many of these technologies 
are believed to have largely remained within the access of state 
facilities or with agricultural corporations, there remains a 
potent risk of illegally acquiring virulent organisms by terrorist 
organisations from these facilities. Remarkably, in 2002, 
during raids on terrorist organisation Al-Qaida hide-outs in 
Afghanistan, US Marines confiscated handwritten documents 
which clearly indicated that this terror group was actively 
pursuing research on anti-personal, anti-veterinary and anti-
plant warfare agents21.
Apart from using anti-crop pathogens, agriculture-
based economy of a country can be systematically controlled 
or destroyed by using genetically modified agricultural 
products or genetically modified (GM) crops. The ‘terminator 
technology’ or the ‘suicide seeds technology’ is an example 
of biotechnology that can be used for malign intentions. This 
technology render seeds infertile after certain generations 
and can be used for controlling agro-economy of a state or 
for waging silent agro-economic warfare. Moreover, through 
introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops with unknown 
genetic manipulations, reproductive potential or long-term 
effects on an agro-ecosystem can be used to systematically 
destroy the existing agro-economy of a country. Interestingly, 
field trials of newly developed GM crops are largely carried 
out in developing countries/ low income countries to protect 
the agro-ecosystem of the countries where these modified 
crops are actually developed. One of the best examples of the 
unforeseen effects of GM crops comes from the introduction of 
Bt-cotton hybrid varieties (expressing Cry toxin, highly toxic to 
Lepidopteran insects) in the Indian subcontinent. Bt-cotton was 
originally aimed at eradicating extremely damaging bollworm 
complex (Order Lepidoptera) from North-west Indian cotton 
producing regions22. Even though this intervention effectively 
removed bollworm menace, their ecological niche was 
gradually occupied by various sap feeding hemipteran insects 
(including whitefly, aphids, thrips), to which, the Cry toxin is 
not only non-toxic but can even augment their population23,24. 
This dramatic shift has now made this cotton ecosystem highly 
vulnerable to trans-border transmission and outbreaks of cotton 
leaf curl virus (transmitted by whitefly, Bemisia tabaci) that 
cause serious economic damage. 
6. LOSSES DUE TO AGROTERRORISM 
ATTACKS
Disturbance in agricultural sector of an agriculture-based 
country can cause destruction of livelihood of numerous 
people, can cause mass unemployment, food shortage, rises in 
food prices, ultimately resulting in destabilised socio-political 
fibre. Losses due to a well- executed anti-agriculture attack 
include both direct and indirect losses. Direct loss includes 
economic losses comprising price of lost crops, expenses for 
destroying and containing infected crop to prevent further 
spread of pathogen, destruction of potentially exposed healthy 
crops, and compensation paid to farmers. In addition, it may 
lead to severe consequences in international trade and export, 
further crippling the economy. 
On the other hand, indirect losses may be economic or may 
cause loss in other terms. In severe and wide-spread bacterial, 
fungal or viral attacks, choices are limited, and complete 
destruction of exposed as well as healthy crop within a certain 
radius is the only option. However, in some cases, pest/vector 
infested and/or pathogen infected crops are often treated with 
various approved chemicals for controlling the pests/vectors or 
the pathogens. This strategy may reduce direct losses to some 
extent, but this method itself is expensive, labour intensive, 
and in general, have serious long-term effects on the said agro-
ecosystem. In addition, such attacks may also disturb trade of 
other non-affected crops, resulting in additional losses.  
7. ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN INDIAN 
ECONOMY
Agricultural practise in Indian subcontinent dates back 
to 10,000 years25,26. presence of great Himalayas to the North, 
Deccan plateau in South, Gangetic delta to its centre and East 
and Thar desert to West, India has blessed India with vastly 
diverse agro-ecological zones, varying from temperate alpine 
climate in north, humid and dry tropical climates in south and 
central regions27. India harbours 4 of 34 global biodiversity 
hotspots, hosting about 8 % of global species diversity27. 
India is seventh largest and second most populous country 
in world, accommodating a population of more than 1.3 
billion27. The developing market economy of India is among 
world’s fastest growing economies, and with USD 2.936 
trillion worth (nominal; 2019 est.), it ranks fifth in terms of 
nominal GDp, while third in purchasing power parity (ppp)27-
29. In Indian economy, agriculture is the most important sector, 
which contributed 23 % of GDp and provided employment 
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to 59 % workforce in 201630. Even though, contribution of 
agriculture in GDp has steadily declined in recent years, it still 
significantly contributed to Indian economy (15-18 % of GDp; 
employing 50 % workforce) during 2017-201830,31. Since its 
independence in 1947, government of India has prioritised 
agricultural production to ensure food to rapidly growing 
population, livelihood to rural population and also for earning 
foreign trade. Owing to adoption of diverse revolutionary 
programmes, India is today top producer of milk, jute and 
pulses, while second in wheat, rice, potato, cotton, sugarcane, 
groundnut, fruits and vegetables27. It is also a major producer 
of plantation crops, spices, livestock, fish etc. India is seventh 
largest agricultural exporter, mostly serving developing and less 
developed nations32. India exports agricultural/horticultural and 
processed foods to more than 120 countries, including Middle 
East, SAARC countries, European Union and United States33. 
Among the major staple foods, India ranks as the third largest 
net-exporter of rice34. 
Despite India’s rapid economic development in industry 
and service sectors, over 70 % of the population is still 
primarily dependent on agriculture for livelihood, of which 
a large proportion (~82 %) are small and marginal farmers30. 
Globally, India ranks first in terms of highest net cropped 
area, followed by US and China35. In terms of cultivation of 
biotech crops, India ranks fifth, ahead of China. Bt Cotton 
is the principal GM crop36 that accounts for nearly 25 % of 
the global cotton produce, making India the second largest 
exporter of cotton37. Despite acquiring self-sufficiency in 
production, Indian agricultural sector is seriously challenged 
with sustainability issues, especially with reference to receding 
water resources, desertification and degradation of farming 
lands. Additionally, agriculture sector being critical to the 
growth of Indian economy also present as a vulnerable target 
for competitor states. Therefore, it is extremely important to 
analyse and assess the risks associated with agroterrorism, 
especially in context of food and cash crops.
8. VULNERABILITY OF AGROTERRORISM 
ATTACKS IN INDIA
Indian agricultural economy is considerably susceptible 
to threat from exotic pathogens/pests that could be deliberately 
introduced to cause huge economic losses. India shares long 
borders with hostile neighbours, which make the threat of such 
introduction even more real. Moreover, climatic conditions are 
favourable for faster propagation and rapid spread of pests, 
pathogens and their vectors in diverse agro-climatic regions 
of India. Another aspect of our agriculture is the trend of 
monoculture, which make such crops exceedingly vulnerable 
to genotype-specific engineered pathogens. It is very much 
possible that several plant diseases and pests have already 
been introduced into our agro-ecosystems through vectors, 
imported contaminated seeds, fertilizers, which might have 
gone unnoticed. Therefore, in present international politico-
economic scenario, the threat to Indian agricultural sector has 
to be taken seriously.
A large number of destructive agricultural pathogens/
pests could be used as potential bio-weapons in India. 
Especially vulnerable crops are rice, wheat and potato, where 
India ranks second in production and are also the principal 
staples. Accordingly, Puccinia triticina (cereal rusts), Rice 
blast (Pyricularia oryzae), Pyricularia graminis-tritici 
(pygt) (Wheat blast), Phytophthora infestans (causing late 
blight in potato, tomato), Ralstonia solanacearum (Ralstonia 
wilt of solanaceous crops) and Xanthomonas campestris pv. 
malvacearum (virulent African pathovar XcmN, still unreported 
from India), rice tungro virus, geminiviruses (causing leaf curl 
disease), citrus tristeza virus, banana bunchy top virus. are 
important from the perspective of Indian agriculture sector. 
Recently, a study on Phytophthora infestans from 2013–14 late 
blight epidemics in eastern and northeastern India has revealed 
an aggressive and fungicide resistant European genotype of 
P. infestans to replace the existing populations, especially in 
regions bordering Bangladesh and Nepal38,39. Likewise, in 2016, 
Magnaporthe oryzae pathotype Triticum (MoT), the devastating 
wheat-blast causing fungus was reported from Bangladesh, its 
first incidence in Asia, since its outbreak in South America in 
198540,41. An ex ante impact assessment suggested enormous 
potentials of this fungus to cause economic losses amounting 
to several million USDs, in addition to devastating effect on 
food security40,41. Although newspaper reports indicated spread 
of this fungus in two districts of West Bengal (Nadia and 
Murshidabad) that border Bangladesh, immediate quarantine 
and preventive measures by the government contained its 
further spread42,43. As a preventive measure, government 
implemented a ‘wheat holiday’ (banned wheat cultivation) in 
these two districts for three years, and prohibited cultivation 
within 5 kilometres of the international border in other districts 
adjoining Bangladesh44.  
On the other hand, different insect vectors and pests have 
been reported from India, which can transmit virulent disease 
pathogens or can cause significant damage to crops. These 
include highly polyphagous Bemisia tabaci (reported to attack 
more than 600 plant species); brown plant hopper (Nilaparvata 
lugens); rice gall midge (Orseolia oryzae). Very recently, fall 
armyworm (Spodoptera frugiperda) was detected in Karnataka, 
which subsequently has spread extremely rapidly in at least 10 
different states of India. This pest is known to feed upon at 
least 300 major food crops45. Recently, Mizoram has reported 
a loss of Rupees 20 crores worth of maize crops due to this 
pest, which indicates the magnitude of damage it can cause 
in a short time46. It remains to be investigated, if the pest was 
deliberately introduced in Indian agro-ecosystem or is a natural 
invader.  
A list of potential anti-crop agents presents in India, 
potential threat agents not reported from India are provided in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
9. THE 2015 OUTBREAK OF COTTON LEAF 
CURL DISEASE IN PUNJAB (INDIA)
Cotton is economically the most important non-food crop, 
significantly contributing to several economies in Indian and 
African subcontinents. Cotton leaf curl virus associated cotton 
leaf curl disease (CLCuD, transmitted by whiteflies) is the 
most devastating disease of cotton and repeated outbreaks of 
CLCuD have severely damaged cotton crops in pakistan, and 
in northwestern India. Interestingly, outbreak causing virulent 
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strains, namely Cotton leaf curl Multan virus (CLCuMuV), 
‘resistance breaking’ Cotton leaf curl Kokhran virus-Burewala 
(CLCuKoV-Bu), their interspecies recombinants originally 
evolved and caused outbreaks in pakistan47,48, followed by 
their trans-border spread and large scale damage to cotton in 
contiguous regions in India47-50. 
During 2015, severe infestation of whitefly was reported 
from southern punjab (India), followed by severe outbreak 
of CLCuD, causing complete destruction of 2/3rd cotton 
crop estimating to loss of 630–670 million US dollars51. 
Apart from badly shattering the national economy; unable 
to withstand losses, at least 15 cotton farmers committed 
suicide, triggering violent protests and socio-political chaos 
in punjab51-52. A thorough investigation of outbreak associated 
virus complex (virus and associated alpha and beta satellite 
molecules) sequences revealed clear evidence of phylogenetic 
and epidemiological relatedness with recently evolved virus 
complexes reported from pakistan53-55. These sequences (from 
India and pakistan) denoted a novel clade of CLCuMuV, 
distinct from previously circulating strains, and had unique 
recombination patterns53,54. 
Remarkably, pattern of 2015 CLCuD outbreak was 
fairly distinct from previous outbreaks. previous CLCuD 
outbreaks in India (associated with CLCuMuV or CLCuKoV-
Bu complexes) were preceded by outbreak with same virus 
complexes in farmer’s fields in pakistan48-50. Therefore, natural 
transborder transmission of viruses (by whiteflies) from 
farmer’ fields in pakistan side to adjacent fields in Indian side is 
apprehensible. Unusually however, virus sequences associated 
with 2015 CLCuD outbreak have not been reported from any 
of the farmer’s fields in pakistan till date. Rather, these virus 
complex sequences were actually detected and reported only 
from experimental cotton plants (cultivated and non-cultivated 
varieties), maintained at two different cotton research institutes 
(Cotton Research Station, Vehari and Central Cotton Research 
Institute, Multan) situated in the punjab province of pakistan53-55. 
In fact, these research stations have maintained infective virus 
complexes from the first CLCuD epidemic (occurred during 
1990s), from which the recent virus complex is suggested to 
have evolved through recombination49,53-55. Taken together, 
finding of newly evolved CLCuMuV 
sequences exclusively from experimental 
plants in research stations in pakistan, 
followed by trans-border outbreak of 
the virus complexes in India without the 
involvement of farmer’s fields in pakistan 
side, do not appear to signify a natural 
pattern of transmission.     
10.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
A country that has a stringent 
surveillance system and is capable of 
rapidly detecting and mitigating disease 
outbreaks is less likely to be targeted. 
Unlike disease outbreaks in human 
and animals, due to presence of very 
large numbers of plants in agricultural 
area, surveillance and monitoring is 
comparatively difficult and disease 
spreads significantly before being visible 
or detected. Unfortunately, surveillance 
system, especially for agriculture sector in 
most of the developing countries, including 
India, is not so stringent. Besides, plant 
pathology and disease detection methods 
being used at present are largely based 
on classical techniques, which are time-
taking and less sensitive as compared to 
molecular techniques. Development of 
rapid diagnostic kits for field detection 
of plant disease is given least priority as 
compared to human or animal diseases, 
precluding early and accurate detection of 
outbreaks in agriculture. Thus, increasing 
surveillance, capability for accurate and 
early detection using molecular tools, is of 
utmost importance to effectively prevent 
and contain an act of agroterrorism. 
Table 2. Some potentially devastating pathogens and pests not reported in India
Against agriculture & 
horticultural
Crops
Magnaporthe oryzae pathotype Triticum (MoT)
Clavibacter michiganensis subsp. sepedonicus
Fire blight of apple and pear Erwinia amylovora
Soybean downy mildew Peronospora manshurica
Blue mold of tobacco Peronospora hyocyami subsp. Tabacina
Tropical rust of maize Physopella zeae
Barley stripe mosaic virus
Mexican cotton boll weevil Anthonomus grandis
Russian wheat aphid-Diuraphis noxia
Mediterranean fruit fly Ceratitis capitata
Against plantation Crops Black pod of cocoa Phytophthora megakarya
powdery rust of coffee Hemelia coffeicola
Sudden death of oak Phytophthora ramorum
South American leaf blight of rubber Microcyclus ulei
Vascular wilt of oil palm Fusarium oxysporum f. sp. elaeidis
Coconut cadang cadang viroid
palm lethal yellowing phytoplasma
pine wood nematode Bursaphelenchus xylophilus
Table 1. Some potentially devastating pests and pathogens present in India
Insect pests Brown plant hopper (Nilaparvata lugens)
Rice gall midge (Orseolia oryzae)
Mustard aphid (Lipaphis erysimi)
Insect pest (Virus vector) Bemisia tabaci, Aphids
Viruses Rice tungro bacilliform virus
Rice tungro spherical virus
Cotton leaf curl virus/ other Begomoviruses
Groundnut bud necrosis virus
Banana bunchy top virus
Tobacco streak virus
Citrus tristeza virus
Bacterial pathogens Bulkholderia solanacearum
Xanthomonas campestris pv. malvacearum
Fungal pathogens Cereal Rusts (Puccinia triticina)
Rice blast (Pyricularia oryzae)
Oomycete pathogens P. infestans, P. nicotianae, P. melonis and forest phytophthoras
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Adoption of new sensitive, specific, and rapid diagnostics 
to detect potential pathogens are therefore urgently needed. 
perhaps, next generation sequencing technologies and remote 
sensing-based technologies have immense applications in 
agro-surveillance and agrothreat mitigation. 
In addition to stringent surveillance and monitoring 
mechanisms, there is also a need for enactment of strict legislation, 
having provisions for considerable punishment for aggressive 
acts against agriculture. An important area of surveillance is 
commercial biotech facilities that have capabilities of culturing 
and genetically modifying microbial organisms. In this aspect, 
plant pathogens being under research even in government and 
private R&D organisations/universities/institutions need to 
be properly scrutinised and secured from theft and accidental 
release in the environment. Finally, as with other forms of 
warfare, ground intelligence remains the key factor to deter 
any act of agroterrorism. Specific measures should be taken to 
educate farmers and other stakeholders involved in agricultural 
sector towards suspecting and reporting any unusual event to 
appropriate authorities. Simultaneously, periodic review of 
disease outbreaks occurring in neighbouring countries and 
assessment of their scientific and technological capabilities 
through research literatures is also necessary for prevention of 
any natural or deliberate outbreaks.
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